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I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) is designed to handle the mobility management on the IP-layer for the emerging IPv6 protocol. One major component in MIPv6 that is needed to be considered is security for most messages used between Mobile Nodes (MNs), Home Agents (HAs), and Correspondent nodes (CNs). The IETF has developed the IPsec protocol suite as an extension to the basic IP protocol [1] based on modern cryptographic technologies making possible strong data authentication and encryption.
There is a concern regarding the performance of IPsec. The required processing power is large for security functions, especially for IPsec. Many users would not have enough throughputs for many applications when very large processing power is required. We can deploy the secure and reliable information infrastructure cost effectively when the ordinary PC platform can handle the IPsec for major applications. Even with IPsec, the majority of vulnerabilities on the internet today are in the application layer, something that IPsec will do nothing to prevent. In Route Optimization (RO) when considering authentication of messages between MN and some unknown CNs, no pre-shared secret key can be used, and there is not existing global public key infrastructure, therefore IPsec is not usable for authentication between MN and CN [2] . Another problem to use IPsec is Quality-of-Service that does not work in IPsec.
There is a serious challenge for securing Route Optimization, which is standard in MIPv6 and occurs when MN moves to another network to eliminate inefficient Triangle Routing. MIPv6 uses Return Routability procedure to authenticate and secure Binding Updates [3] , [4] . There is no authentication and data protection method in RO when MN moves from one network to another, in RFC 3775, standard for MIPv6.
In this paper, a new security method in terms of data integrity is proposed that overcomes the problem of unprotected data in MIPv6 RO where there are problems and limitations of using IPsec.
The organized of this paper is as follow: Section II presents the background of MIPv6 Security. The new security method, and Test-bed design are presented in section III, Followed by result and discussion and finally conclusion of the paper.
II. BACKGROUND OF MOBILE IPV6 SECURITY
The basic objective during the development of Mobile IPv6 has been that it must be at least as secure as basic IPv6 or IPv4 from the Mobile Node perspective and it should not introduce any new security threats to IPv6 from the network and other node's perspective. Whenever Route Optimization is used, it will give attackers a good opportunity to exploit Mobile IPv6 by sending false Binding Updates (BUs) during the process [3] .
Attacks against Mobile IPv6 are classified as follows [2] , [4] , [5] : attacks against BUs, attacks against Route Optimization, reflection attack, attacks against MN -HA tunnel and IPv6 Routing Header, and attacks against security mechanisms.
Most of these attacks are considered as Denial-ofService (DoS). Some of the threats also open up possibilities for Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), connection hijacking, and impersonation attacks.
An attacker on the path between mobile node and correspondent node, considered as MITM attack against route optimization, is able to modify the packets. If the data in the packets is not protected, this can lead to a compromise of secrecy and integrity.
The IETF has developed the IPsec protocol suite as an extension to the basic IP protocol [1] . It is based on modern cryptographic technologies making possible strong data authentication and encryption. It works on the network level on the protocol stack. Because of this it is invisible to applications. IPsec is compatible with current Internet standards in both IPv4 and IPv6, but in IPv6, IPsec is defined as mandatory feature ( [3] , [6] , [7] , [8] ).
The IPsec protocol suite has two modes of operation, Tunnel mode and Transport mode, and includes three IP extensions ( [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] ): Authentication Header (AH), Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP), and Internet Key Exchange (IKE).
The current specification defines that instead of IPsec Authentication Header (AH), IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) should be used for authentication between Mobile Node and Home Agent, and Return Routability (RR) should be used for authentication between Mobile Node and Correspondent Node [1] , [3] , [8] , [9] . The specification makes also possible to use some other, more secure methods than RR for authentication between Mobile Node and Correspondent Node [9] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] .
III. PROPOSED ROUTE OPTIMIZATION SECURITY

SCHEME
The proposed security method is based on data integrity on top of Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization to secure data and prepare a safe communication between Mobile Node (MN) and Correspondent Node (CN). This method is able to detect and prevent Man-In-TheMiddle (MITM) attacks.
The MN starts encryption when attack is detected, not from the beginning of the session because some of the applications are delay sensitive, including real time services such as streaming media or interactive multimedia, as well as data services requiring low latency.
The attacker is located on the path between MN and CN, and modifies the data from and to CN. Return Routability (RR) is the current protocol to secure RO, which is for protecting signal messages such as Binding Update (BU). If an attacker tampers against data in RO, the RR is not able to detect or prevent. The proposed method can be performed on top of the RR procedure to detect and prevent any MITM attack. Figure 1 shows the design and scenario of the Testbed. The implemented network consists of three computers and one laptop (MN). Fedora Core 5 is used as operating system with MIPL (Mobile IPv6 for Linux) version 2.0.2 that is the most recent release for MIPv6 implementation and fully RFC 3775 compliant. When MN is sending the packets, it copy and save some packets randomly by putting a flag to inform the CN to return these packets. During packet generation process, MN also waits for flagged packet from CN to compare with the same packet ID that saved before. If the received packet is not same as generated one, that means someone has changed or modified the packets. The MN notifies CN and starts encryption if attack is detected, otherwise it will continue normal procedure.
If attacker changes the flag, the CN will not return the packet, or CN will send back the unselected packet. In these cases, the MN starts encryption if it does not receive three flagged packets, or receives an unselected packet. Figure 2 and 3 show the proposed algorithm in MN and CN, respectively.
The key encryption and decryption is generated by the HA at the beginning of the session establishment when MN registers in the HA and wishes to communicate with CN. The MN and CN keep this key and use it whenever is needed. From the results of the Test-bed, it is shown that how attacker can modify the packets and this method prevents it, as well as performance of the security proposed method. Prior to the Test-bed performance measurement, Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to synchronize the time on MN (packet generator) and CN (packet receiver). MN generates 1000-byte-long unicast packets periodically in every 1s.
As mentioned in section III, MN is able to compare the generated packet and received packet to detect the attack. To prevent the attackers from capturing and modifying the data, we used an encryption method to do so. There are strong methods of authentication involving public key cryptography that can be used. Our proposed scheme involves the using of Transport Layer Security protocol with both peers knowing a secret key.
Packets receptions in conventional and proposed methods are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 , respectively. The CN receives the corrupted data in conventional method while the original data is received by CN in proposed method. That means the attacker is unable to launch the attack.
As it is shown in Figure 5 , each data packet is sent with flag, packet number and sending time. Therefore CN is able to calculate the delay by subtract the sending time from receiving time. When CN receives a packet with flag (e.g. packet number 17), it will return it back to MN. CN will start decryption whenever it receives the encrypted data. Figure 6 shows the delay in both conventional and proposed method. From packet number 1 to 17 the delays are same in both methods. It can be seen that the delay is increased in new enhanced method from packet number 17, because of the encryption function. Figure 7 shows the overall goodputs based on data integrity in conventional and proposed method. Goodput is the number of uncorrupted received packets exactly like transmitted one.
It can be seen before starting attack in 17s, the goodputs are same for both methods. After 17s, due to effect of the attacker, the overall goodput is degraded for conventional system and the maximum number of unmodified received packet is 27 from 100. For new proposed method, the goodput is increased linearly. Based on the RFC 3775, there is no authentication and data protection method in route optimization. This paper gives an overview of Mobile IPv6 security, proposes a new security method algorithm, development of the Test-bed for evaluating the performance, and effectiveness of the proposed method in comparison with the conventional method. The proposed security method is based on data integrity on top of route optimization to protect the data and prepare a safe communication between mobile node and correspondent node. This method is able to detect and prevent Man-In-The-Middle attacks by encrypting the packets. It can significantly improve the protection of the data in route optimization.
